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TROUBLE IN THE CARIBBEAN: RESPONSES
TO A POTENTIAL CHINESE-BAHAMIAN
BILATERAL FISHING AGREEMENT
KYLE ELLIOTT∗
ABSTRACT
As of 2011, the Caribbean Sea was one of the only fisheries
unoccupied by China’s Distant Water Fleet (DWF). However, in 2016,
officials from the People’s Republic of China and the Bahamas
discussed a proposal for a bilateral commercial fishing agreement in
Bahamian waters. An official agreement was never proposed, but given
the notoriety of China’s DFW and the Bahamas’ monitoring and
enforcement problems, such an agreement could have devastating
impacts on the Caribbean fishery.
The proposal received international criticism from fishermen,
scientists, and politicians, demonstrating the perennial conflict between
the global commercial fishing industry and those engaged in
recreational, sport, or subsistence fishing. In 1982, the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) attempted to resolve
this conflict by establishing fishery conservation measures. However,
these measures are undermined by concepts such as maximum
sustainable yield and optimum utilization, which prioritize the market
value of a fishery’s resources over its recreational value. As the global
commercial fishing industry begins to converge on one of the last
fishing frontiers, the United States must shift how the world views
fishery management. This article will discuss how stakeholders to the
agreement can use both legal principles and non-legal incentives to
induce the Bahamas to remain a sport fishing haven and support its
artisanal fishing industry.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Although China’s Distant Water Fleet (DWF) extends to almost
every major fishery in the world, as of 2011, Chinese commercial
vessels were not fishing in the Caribbean Sea.1 However, in October
2016, officials from the People’s Republic of China and the Bahamas
shocked the Caribbean fishing community by discussing a proposal
for a bilateral commercial fishing agreement in Bahamian waters.2
While the Bahamas’ commercial fishing industry effectively captures
inshore resources like spiny lobster, Nassau grouper, and queen
conch,3 its offshore pelagic fishery4 is harvested exclusively by tourists
and recreational fishers.5 Therefore, pelagic fish landings are often
underreported, and the fishery is considered underexploited by
current fishery management standards.6
China is a cooperative member of many international
conservation and sustainability organizations.7 However, in a 2009
survey measuring compliance with the FAO’s Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries, China’s DWF had a failing grade in Illegal,
Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, ranking 44th out of 53
1. Daniel Pauly, et al., China’s Distant-Water Fisheries in the 21st Century, 15 FISH &
FISHERIES 474, 477 (2014).
2. Candia Dames, Letter Proves Gray Wrong, NASSAU GUARDIAN (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://thenassauguardian.com/2016/11/02/letter-proves-gray-wrong/.
3. CARIBBEAN REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, CRFM STATISTICS AND
INFORMATION REPORT FOR 2012 32–33 (2014). The inshore fishery consists of species living in
habitats from shallow-water coral reefs to the continental drop off point, where the continental
shelf descends towards the deep ocean floor. Id. at 15–16 tbl.6.
4. The offshore pelagic fishery consists of medium and large sized fish such as tuna,
mackerel, and marlin, living in the open waters of the ocean. Id. at 15 tbl.6.
5. ROB SOUTHWICK ET AL., FAO, W. Cent. Atl. Fishery Comm’n, Recreational
Fisheries Economic Impact Assessment Manual and its Application in Two Study Cases in the
Caribbean: Martinique and The Bahamas 95, 100 (2016).
5. Id.
6. See generally, BISESSAR CHAKALALL & KEVERN COCHRANE, FAO FISHERIES TECH.
PAPER, MANAGEMENT OF LARGE PELAGIC FISHERIES IN CARICOM COUNTRIES 1 (Robin
Mahon & Patrick McConney eds., 2004) (explaining the state of deep-water pelagic fisheries in
CARICOM countries); Sean Hern, Competing Values: Taking a Broad View on the Narrowing
Conservation Regime of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 16 AM. U.
INT’L L. R. 177, 194–95 (2000) (arguing that UNCLOS concepts like maximum sustainable yield
and optimum utilization emphasize the market value of a fishery over its potential value as a
sports fishery, leading to the determination that the fishery is “underutilized”).
7. See, e.g., Regional Fishery Bodies Summary Descriptions: International Commission
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, FAO, http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/iccat/en (last visited
Apr. 6, 2018) (listing China as a member of ICCAT— the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas); About WCPFC, W. & CENT. PAC. FISHERIES COMM’N,
https://www.wcpfc.int/about-wcpfc (last visited Apr. 6, 2018)(listing China as a member of the
WCPFC— the Western & Central Pacific Fisheries Commission).
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countries.8 Given the notoriety of China’s DFW9 and the Bahamas’
monitoring and enforcement problems,10 an agreement between
China and the Bahamas could have a devastating impact on the
Caribbean fishery. Stakeholders in Florida and in the Bahamas, many
of whom rely on the fishery for either subsistence or recreational
fishing, heavily criticized the proposed agreement.11 Eventually,
discussions ceased before the Bahamian government officially
considered an agreement.12
Public response to a Chinese-Bahamian bilateral fishing
agreement highlights the longstanding battle between the global
commercial fishing industry and those engaged in recreational, sport,
or subsistence fishing. However, current ocean law fails to strike a
balance between these two parties, emphasizing the optimal
exploitation of resources over non-consumptive management
objectives.13 Although the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) created some conservation measures,14 concepts
such as maximum sustainable yield and optimum utilization
undermine these measures by prioritizing the aggregate market value
of a fishery’s resources.15 Policymakers should instead consider a
8. TONY J. PITCHER, ET AL., SAFE CONDUCT? TWELVE YEARS FISHING UNDER THE UN
CODE 26 (2008). Although this score was for China as a whole, rather than its Distant Water
Fleet, the ranking can be mostly attributed to acts of the DWF since the China regulates its
domestic fishing industry tighter than its DWF. See Tabitha Grace Mallory, Ph.D. Candidate in
China Studies, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Testimony before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 (Jan. 26, 2012) [hereinafter Mallory
Testimony].
9. For a discussion of abuses by China’s DWF, see Section II.C.
10. SOUTHWICK ET AL., supra note 5, at 100.
11. Natario McKenzie, Fishermen Blast $2.1bn China Deal, TRIBUNE (Bah.), Nov. 7, 2016,
http://www.tribune242.com/news/2016/nov/07/fishermen-blast-21bn-china-deal/
(reporting
criticism from the president of the Bahamas Commercial Fishing Alliance); Jim Turner, Talks to
Sell China Fishing Rights in Bahamas Alarm Florida, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 16, 2016,
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/national/talks-sell-china-fishing-rights-bahamas-alarmflorida/JAhVZ6Dozi3fgkZ6PgyJqM (noting the Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission’s
concern over an agreement’s potential impact on the state’s fisheries); Steve Waters, Florida
Anglers Help Stop Proposed China-Bahamas Deal, SUN SENTINEL, Nov. 29, 2016,
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/sports/outdoors/fl-outdoors-fishing-report-1130-20161129story.html (noting that the Bahamian government was overwhelmed with contact from Florida
fishermen denouncing a proposed Chinese-Bahamian fishing agreement).
12. Sloan Smith, PM: Proposal with China is a no go, NASSAU GUARDIAN, Nov. 22, 2016,
https://thenassauguardian.com/2016/11/22/pm-proposal-with-china-is-a-no-go/.
13. EUGENE H. BUCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32185, U.N. CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA: LIVING RESOURCES PROVISIONS 3 (2011).
14. See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
15. Hern, supra note 6.
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regime that adequately recognizes an area’s economic value as a
sports fishery and conservation value as a conservation area.
As the global commercial fishing industry begins to converge on
one of the last fishing frontiers, the United States must shift how the
world views fishery management. This article will discuss how the
United States and other stakeholders can use both legal and non-legal
incentives to induce the Bahamas to remain a sport-fishing haven and
support its artisanal fishing industry.16
II. A CHINESE-BAHAMIAN COMMERCIAL FISHING
AGREEMENT: PARTIES, DISCUSSIONS, AND POTENTIAL
PROBLEMS
UNCLOS established rules governing the worlds’ oceans, many
of which are now generally accepted principles of international law.17
Central to these rules is the concept of an exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), which is a 200 nautical mile limit around a coastal state in
which the state has the exclusive right to explore, exploit, conserve,
and manage natural resources.18 This right carries corresponding
obligations, including a duty to promote the “optimum utilization” of
resources within the EEZ.19 The duty of optimum utilization has
contributed to numerous bilateral fishing agreements that allow a
foreign state to exploit unused resources in a coastal state’s EEZ.20
China is a major player in this industry, sending vessels to
approximately 79 countries as of 2012.21

16. Although this article will primarily focus on activities inside the Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) of the Bahamas, many of the arguments may also apply to the rest of the
Caribbean countries. The region’s tight concentration of sovereign islands results in a fishery
consisting entirely of each country’s EEZ. Asha Singh, Governance in the Caribbean Sea:
Implications for Sustainable Development 3 (Dec. 20, 2008) (unpublished research paper,
United Nations- Nippon Foundation Fellowship Programme. The fishery does not have any
high seas. Most countries in the Caribbean fishery are similar to the Bahamas in that they have
modestly developed commercial fishing industries in relation to tourism. See generally
CARIBBEAN REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, supra note 3 (describing each member states’
commercial fishing industries). Thus, this article extends to the entire Caribbean fishery.
17. For which provisions are considered customary international law, see Ashley J. Roach,
Today’s Customary International Law of the Sea, 45 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 239 (2014).
18. UNCLOS, supra note 14, at art. 56.
19. Id. at art. 62.
20. Mallory Testimony, supra note 8, at 2.
21. BLOMEYER, ET AL., EUR. PARL. COMM. ON FISHERIES, THE ROLE OF CHINA IN
WORLD FISHERIES 67 (2012). Due to the lack of transparency surrounding Chinese bilateral
agreements, the exact number of countries with which China has officially formed an agreement
is difficult to calculate. Id.
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A. The Parties
The Commonwealth of the Bahamas, located only 50 miles from
the United States at its closest point, is a sovereign archipelagic state
in the Caribbean containing over 700 islands, cays, and islets.22
Because of its dispersed nature, the Bahamas has the largest EEZ in
the Caribbean, more than double the size of the next largest
country.23 To put this into perspective, the Bahamas’ EEZ is only 28
percent smaller than China’s EEZ, despite having a fraction of the
land area and economic resources.24 Perhaps due to its proximity to
the United States and vast ocean resources, the Bahamas boasts the
second highest per capita GDP in the Caribbean, 75-80 percent of
which comes from tourism.25 Recreational fishing contributes to
approximately five percent of the country’s total GDP, while
commercial fishing contributes to less than one percent.26
Bahamian fisheries consist of the following sectors: (1) an
artisanal commercial fishery that primarily targets demersal species,
such as queen conch and spiny lobster; (2) a large-scale, commercial
spiny lobster fishery; (3) a sport and recreational fishery; and (4) a
subsistence fishery in which fish are consumed by fishers and their
families.27 Although the Bahamas’ commercial fishing industry
effectively captures inshore resources like spiny lobster, Nassau
grouper, and queen conch,28 its offshore pelagic fishery is harvested
exclusively by tourists and recreational fishers targeting species like
mahi-mahi, wahoo, tuna, swordfish, and marlin.29
China’s Distant Water Fishing Fleet (DWF) is the other party to
the potential agreement. “Distant waters” refer to major fishing areas

22. Geography, THE BAHAMAS, http://www.bahamas.co.uk/about-the-bahamas/facts/
geography (last visited Dec. 11, 2017).
23. CARIBBEAN REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, supra note 3, at 4.
24. Although the boundaries of both country’s EEZ is in dispute, the Bahamas’ EEZ is
approximately 629,293 sq. km., while China’s EEZ is 877, 019 sq. km. Id. at 4.
25. The World Factbook: The Bahamas, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/bf.html (last updated Nov. 29, 2017).
26. In 2014, the total GDP of the Bahamas was $8.98 billion. Id. At this time, the FAO
estimated that the recreational fishing industry contributed approximately $411 million to the
GDP and commercial fishing contributed approximately $80 million. SOUTHWICK ET AL., supra
note 5, at 99. This comes out to about 4.6% and .09%, respectively.
27. Nicola S. Smith & Dirk Zeller, Bahamas Catch Reconstruction: Fisheries Trends in a
Tourism-Driven Economy (1950-2010) 2 (Fisheries Ctr., U. OF B.C., Working Paper No. 201308, 2008) http://www.seaaroundus.org/doc/publications/wp/2013/Smith-and-Zeller-Bahamas.pdf.
28. CARIBBEAN REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, supra note 3, at 32–34 tbl.17.
29. Id.; SOUTHWICK ET AL., supra note 5.
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that are not adjacent to the fishing country, such as the high seas30 or
the EEZ of another country.31 In 2010, China’s DWF became the
largest in the world, totaling approximately 1,900 vessels.32 At this
time, the fleet consisted mainly of old vessels without adequate
equipment and technology for long-range sea travel.33 Therefore, its
production capacity was lower than fleets in other developed
countries.34 To combat this problem, China implemented a five-year
plan to develop large-scale fishing operations expected to produce 1.7
million tons by 2015. The plan included measures to expand and
update the DWF fleet and utilize remote ports in fishing operations.35
The initiative succeeded. From 2013 to 2014, the fleets’ catch
estimates grew from 1.35 million tons to 2 million tons – a 48 percent
increase.36 This figure might be much larger; a study by the European
Parliament contends that China massively underreports its DWF
statistics by overlooking catches from IUU fishing and catches from
joint ventures with a coastal country to fish in that country’s EEZ.37
The study estimates that China’s DWF instead caught an average of
4.6 million tons a year from 2000 to 2011.38 Regardless, it is clear that
China’s DWF has become one of the world’s most powerful fishing
fleets.
China has many possible motivations for expanding its DWF
fleet. First, the country has a growing need for fish as a domestic food
source. Although fish consumption is difficult to estimate, even
conservative approximations show that China’s fish consumption has
more than doubled since 1990.39 However, an analysis of what
30. The area outside a country’s EEZ is known as the “high seas.” UNCLOS, supra note
14, at art. 86. This area is open for fishing to all states. Id. at art. 87.
31. Mallory Testimony, supra note 8, at 2.
32. Id. at 3.
33. FAO, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 31 (2016),
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5555e.pdf [hereinafter State of the World’s Fisheries].
34. Id.
35. Mallory Testimony, supra note 8, at 3.
36. FAO, STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE, supra note 33, at 9–10
(noting the catch estimates officially reported by China). The catch statistics of China’s DWF,
depend on the fleet’s scope. China’s EEZ is located in a larger area known as “61 Northwest
Pacific.” Id. China officially reported the above statistics for catches from its distant water
fishery. However, this includes all area outside China’s EEZ, including the area inside 61
Northwest Pacific. If the scope of China’s DWF is narrowed to include only the area outside 61
Northwest Pacific, the catch statistics would be much smaller– 586,000 tons in 2013 and 880,000
tons in 2014. These figures still amount to about a 50% increase. Id.
37. Id. at 21.
38. Id.
39. BLOMEYER, ET AL., supra note 21, at 59–60.

10. Elliott Final - DELPF Spring 2018 (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2018]

5/29/2018 2:20 PM

CHINESE-BAHAMIAN BILATERAL FISHING AGREEMENT

311

Chinese companies do with the fish might reveal a more telling
motivation. One expert estimated that China exported almost half of
its fish (many of which were high-value fish) to developed countries,
implying that the growth of China’s DWF is driven by economic
concerns rather than domestic food consumption.40 Finally, China
may view current ocean expansion as the key to guarding future
ocean interests. In 2010, China created a task force to analyze its
DWF industry.41 In advocating for expansion of the fleet, the task
force argued that the countries with longer histories of using the
ocean have more influence on how ocean resources are distributed
and receive a larger share.42 Policy makers should consider these
drivers when determining how to best limit the environmental impact
of China’s DWF in the Caribbean.
China’s DWF industry is heavily dependent on subsidies.43 In
fact, Chinese economists estimated that government subsidies
accounted for approximately half of the net profits of China National
Fisheries Corporation, the country’s largest international fishing
company.44 Perhaps because of this dependence, the once stateowned industry is now 70% privately owned.45 As a result, the
Chinese government has lost control of its DWF industry, leading to
inaccurate reporting by the fleet.46 In a 2009 study measuring
countries’ compliance with the FAO Code of Conduct of Responsible
Fisheries, China received a passing score on intentions but a failing
score on enforcement.47 Unlike state-owned fisheries, private
companies do not report data for accidentally caught recreational fish
species, and they report inaccurate information regarding location

40. Tabitha Mallory, China’s Distant Water Fishing Industry: Evolving Policies and
Implications, 38 MARINE POL’Y 99, 100 (2013) [hereinafter China’s DWF Industry].
41. Mallory Testimony, supra note 8, at 3.
42. Id. (discussing the task force’s report). The report stated, “if you occupy and possess,
then you have rights and interests.” Id.
43. Id. at 4.
44. See id. (discussing a report from three Chinese economists); About us, CHINA NAT’L
FISHERIES CORP., http://www.cnfc.com.cn/view_en.asp?classid=14 (last visited Dec. 10, 2017).
45. BLOMEYER ET AL., supra note 21, at 31.
46. Mallory Testimony, supra note 8, at 3.
47. PITCHER ET AL., supra note 8, at 11 fig.5.
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and species type.48 This creates problems for host countries seeking to
measure the impact of China’s DWF on the country’s resources.49
B. Discussion Timeline & Proposal Details
In a letter dated October 3, 2016, the Minister of Agriculture and
Marine Resources for the Bahamas authorized the Ambassador to
China to pursue an agreement that would China access to fishing
rights in Bahamian waters.50 The Bahamian Ambassador to China
did, in fact, speak to a Chinese official about such an agreement.51
The contemplated proposal allowed for 100 corporate entities, each
equally owned by Chinese and Bahamian companies, to receive
commercial fishing licenses.52 In return, over a 10-year period, the
Chinese promised to invest $2.1 billion in the form of cash,
equipment, and expertise.53 Although the proposal called for joint
ownership of the companies, it prohibited non-Bahamians from
operating the fishing vessels.54 The proposal did not specify what
species of fish the new vessels would target, but most people believe
the agreement was intended to exploit the Bahamas’ pelagic
migratory fish resources.55
Prior to 2016, the Bahamas had been opposed to any kind of
foreign fishing. In 1993, controversy arose when a faction of the
Bahamian cabinet reportedly considered allowing foreign fleets of

48. JIAHUA CHENG ET AL., AN ESTIMATION OF COMPLIANCE OF THE FISHERIES OF
CHINA WITH ARTICLE 7 (FISHERIES MANAGEMENT) OF THE UN CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
RESPONSIBLE FISHING 9 (2013), https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=
ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnx0b255cGl0Y2hlcndlYnNpdGV8Z3g6Njc5ZWMwMTc1OTY3Nm
MxYg.
49. See infra pp. 13–14 (discussing effect of unreliable data on overfishing).
50. Dames, supra note 2.
51. Rashad Rolle, D’Aguilar: Govt Selling Souls to the Chinese, TRIBUNE (Bah.) (Nov. 3,
2016), http://www.tribune242.com/news/2016/nov/03/daguilar-govt-selling-souls-chinese/.
52. Dames, supra note 2.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. BNT Statement on Proposal for Chinese Funding for Investment in Bahamian Fishing
Industry, BAHAMAS NATIONAL TRUST (Nov. 5, 2016), https://bnt.bs/bnt-statement-on-chineseinvestment-bahamian-fishing-industry/ (noting that scientific assessments of pelagic fish stocks
would be necessary to be fully informed of the ramifications of the agreement). The Bahamian
Ambassador to China stated that he “planned to meet with Bahamian fishermen to see if there
was any interest in joint ventures with Chinese capital to expand into areas that are traditionally
not exploited.” Id. The deep-water pelagic fishery is one of the last Bahamian fisheries not
exploited by the commercial sector. CARIBBEAN REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, supra
note 3, at 32–34 tbl.17. Given Ambassador Gomez’s comments, current speculation over the
agreements purpose is probably correct.
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long-line trawlers access to the country’s fisheries.56 Parliament
responded by banning long-line fishing.57 In 2003, a fleet of Korean
fishing vessels was spotted fishing in Bahamian waters under the
banner of a Bahamian company.58 However, the Bahamian
government did not issue the company permits, and the fleet
departed.59 In 2007, the country allowed a Chinese company to
“experimentally” harvest shark fins and sea cucumbers as part of a
joint venture with the Bahamas.60 Sharks were later protected, but the
company is still harvesting sea cucumbers.61 Considering the
government’s prior protectionist attitude towards its fisheries,
discussions between Bahamian and Chinese officials regarding a
bilateral fishing agreement represent a significant policy shift.
The discussions received heavy criticism from U.S. Senator
Marco Rubio, Floridian stakeholders, fishermen, environmental
groups, scientists, and members of the Bahamian government.62
Although the Bahamian government repeatedly downplayed the
discussions, there is reason to believe that a similar agreement could
happen in the future.63 Even after the Bahamian Prime Minister
stated that the cabinet would have rejected such a proposal, the
Minister of Agriculture and Marine Resources stated that he “has not
withdrawn the letter,” and expressed fear that the Chinese would

56. Larry Smith, Tough Call: What Chinese Fishing Proposal Means for the Bahamas,
TRIBUNE (Bah.), Nov. 9, 2016, http://www.tribune242.com/news/2016/nov/09/tough-call-whatchinese-fishing-proposal-means-bah/.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Nominations Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, infra note 166 (quoting
Sen. Marco Rubio); Natario McKenzie, Fishermen Blast $2.1bn China Deal, THE TRIBUNE
(Bah.), November 7, 2016, http://www.tribune242.com/news/2016/nov/07/fishermen-blast-21bnchina-deal/ (reporting criticism from the president of the Bahamas Commercial Fishing
Alliance); Jim Turner, Talks to Sell China Fishing Rights in Bahamas Alarm Florida, PALM
BEACH POST, November 16, 2016 (noting the Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission’s concern
over an agreement’s potential impact on the state’s fisheries); Steve Waters, Florida Anglers
Help Stop Proposed China-Bahamas Deal, SUN SENTINEL, November 29, 2016 (noting that the
Bahamian government was overwhelmed with contact from Florida fishermen denouncing a
proposed Chinese-Bahamian fishing agreement); Dames, supra note 2.
63. Sancheska Dorsett, Gray: Govt Would Not Give Foreigners License to Fish, TRIBUNE
(Bah.) (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.tribune242.com/news/2016/nov/03/gray-govt-would-not-giveforeigners-licence-fish/.
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discontinue investment in the country due to the criticism.64 Such a
deal could have damaging effects to the Caribbean fishery.
C. Foreseeable Problems with a Chinese-Bahamian Joint Venture
Although bilateral agreements allow developing countries to
harvest their fishery resources, fisheries governance experts argue
that “[bilateral agreements] on the whole have led to unsustainable
use of fisheries resources and have negatively impacted the
socioeconomic development of host countries.”65 Major problems
with these agreements include pollution,66 conflicts with artisanal
fisherman,67 and unsustainable fishing methods.68 A ChineseBahamian deal like the one discussed would generate some of the
issues that plagued past bilateral agreements while avoiding others.
Such a deal would also create unique problems not experienced by
other nations. While some of these issues affect only the Bahamas,
many also impact the United States because of the countries’ close
proximity and the migratory nature of many fish stocks. This section
analyzes these potential problems.
i. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing
IUU fishing is perhaps the largest concern with a ChineseBahamian joint venture. This includes “fishing without a license or
quota for certain species, unauthorized transshipments to cargo
vessels, failing to report catches or making false reports, keeping
undersized fish or fish that are otherwise protected by regulations,
fishing in closed areas or during closed seasons, and using prohibited
fishing gear.”69 A Chinese-Bahamian bilateral agreement is

64. Gray Suggests Chinese Agri-Fisheries Deal Still Open to Negotiation, THE NASSAU
GUARDIAN, Nov. 10, 2016, https://thenassauguardian.com/2016/11/10/gray-suggests-chineseagri-fisheries-deal-still-open-to-negotiation/.
65. China’s DWF Industry, supra note 40, at 103.
66. See e.g., Afp Gunjur, Pollution Clouds Gambia’s China Courtship, TAIPEI TIMES, Jul.
31, 2017, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2017/07/31/2003675663 (describing
the destruction caused by pollution from a Chinese fishmeal factory intended to support China’s
DWF in Gambia).
67. See e.g., China’s DWF Industry, supra note 40, at 104 (describing conflicts between
Chinese DWF vessels and artisanal fishermen in Liberia).
68. For a general discussion on the effects of unsustainable fishing practices in bilateral
agreements see Jacqueline Alder & Ussif Rashid Sumaila, Western Africa: A Fish Basket of
Europe Past and Present, 13 J. ENV’T. & DEV. 156, 169 (2004) (noting that “[m]any fishers in
Ghana have actually become poorer as the landed values from their fisheries have increased”).
69. IUU Fishing- Frequently Asked Questions, NOAA, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/
ia/iuu/faqs.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2017).
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particularly susceptible to IUU fishing given the notorious fishing
practices of China’s DWF and the Bahamas’ inability to sufficiently
monitor or enforce fishing regulations.
In a 2009 study, the Chinese DWF ranked 44 out of 53 countries
in IUU fishing with an “unequivocally failing” score.70 Many
developing countries that enter into bilateral agreements with China
do not have the financial resources to survey vessels or enforce
fishing regulations.71 For example, in Cameroon, Chinese DWF
vessels, many of which are legally registered as Cameroon businesses
in accordance with a joint venture agreement between the two
countries, are beginning to overwhelm the Cameroonian navy.72 Even
if the agreement calls for so-called “dedicated funds” to support the
fishery sector from the increase in fishing activity, governments in
coastal countries rarely use these funds for their intended purposes.73
The Bahamas have multiple weaknesses in monitoring and
enforcement that make IUU fishing a major risk. Although West
African countries are commonly thought to have too few resources to
combat IUU fishing in their waters, the Bahamas ranks lower in GDP
per square kilometer of EEZ than Cameroon, Angola, Ghana,
Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Gambia, and Sierra Leone.74 The fact
that only Bahamian citizens would be operating the fishing vessels is
hardly consequential, considering Chinese DWF companies would
manage the vessels’ operations. A similar agreement is in place in
Cameroon, where IUU fishing regularly persists.75
Furthermore, the Bahamas has a long history of overfishing,76
which has continued for some species. The Caribbean Spiny Lobster,
by far the leading species captured in the Bahamas,77 is considered

70. PITCHER, ET AL., supra note 8, at 26.
71. Alder & Sumaila, supra note 68, at 170.
72. China’s DWF Industry, supra note 40, at 106; Moki Edwin Kindzeka, Cameroon
Deploys Navy to Seize Illegal Fishing Vessels, VOICE OF AMERICA (Oct. 10, 2016),
https://www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-navy-fishing-boats/3544226.html.
73. See Vlad M. Kaczynski & David L. Fluharty, European policies in West Africa: Who
Benefits from Fisheries Agreements?, 26 MARINE POL’Y 75, 77, n.5, n.6 (2003) (describing the
use of dedicated funds in Guinea Bissau).
74. See infra, note 84 and accompanying text.
75. See Kindzeka, supra note 72.
76. See MICHAEL CRATON & GAIL SAUNDERS, ISLANDERS IN THE STREAM: A HISTORY
OF THE BAHAMIAN PEOPLE 88–89 (Univ. of GA. Press, 2011) (describing the seventeenth
century Bahamian seal hunting industry); HENRY FRANK MOORE, THE COMMERCIAL
SPONGES AND THE SPONGE FISHERIES 471 (1910) (claiming that the Bahamian sponge fishery
had become “exhausted by overfishing” as early as 1875).
77. CARIBBEAN REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, supra note 3, at 32–34 tbl.17.
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overexploited by some experts.78 Even experts that believe the fishery
is in good condition have expressed concerns over the reported
decline in landings and size.79 The Nassau Grouper, the most landed
finfish in the country, is also likely either fully exploited or overexploited in the Bahamas and United States.80
Overfishing is primarily due to insufficient resources and
unreliable data.81 Experts estimate that from 1950 through 1986, the
Bahamas fishery had more unreported catch than reported catch– in
some years, unreported catch more than doubles the amount of
reported fish caught.82 However, reporting failures are not only a
historical issue. In 2014, an estimated 40% of total catch went
unreported.83 Out of 151 qualifying countries, the Bahamas ranked
128th in GDP per square kilometer of EEZ,84 and the Department of
Marine Resources has only six full-time vessels85 to enforce
regulations for approximately 628,000 square kilometers86 of ocean.
This trend will only persist if China’s DWF enters the region.
Second, much of the data on the Bahamian commercial fishing
industry are unreliable and outdated, and regional fishery
management organizations have difficulty measuring how many
78. See e.g. Ernesto A. Chavez, Potential Production of the Caribbean Spiny Lobster
(Decapoda, Palinura) Fisheries, 82 CRUSTACEANA 1393, 1400–01 (2009).
79. Id. at 1401.
80. See 81 C.F.R. § 42268 (2016) (listing the Nassau Grouper as threatened under the
Endangered Species Act); NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NASSAU GROUPER, EPINEPHELUS
STRIATUS (BLOCH 1792) BIOLOGICAL REPORT 50 (2013).
81. See Chavez, supra note 78, at 1401 (noting the difficulty in monitoring and
enforcement of the spiny lobster fishery); NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 80 at
46–53 (noting the data collection problems associated with Nassau Grouper landings).
82. Catches by Reporting Status in the Waters of Bahamas, THE SEA AROUND US,
http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez/44?chart=catch-chart&dimension=reportingstatus&measure=tonnage&limit=10 (last visited Dec. 15, 2017).
83. See id. (estimating that the Bahamas had 8,480 tons of unreported catch, out of 20,780
tons total).
84. This ranking was created by combining GDP statistics from the International
Monetary Fund and EEZ statistics from the Sea Around Us, a research initiative at The
University of British Columbia. World Economic Outlook Database, INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND (Oct. 2017), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/weodata/
download.asp; Simon Claus et al., Marine Regions: Towards a Global Standard for
Georeferenced Marine Names and Boundaries, 37 MARINE GEODESY 99 (2014); Tools & Data,
SEA AROUND US, http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez (last visited Dec. 11, 2017).
85. About The Department of Marine Resources, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAHAMAS,
http://www.bahamas.gov.bs (follow “Agency Sites” hyperlink; then follow “Marine Resources,
Dept. of” hyperlink; then follow “About Us” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 11, 2017).
86. Catches by Taxon in the Waters of Bahamas, SEA AROUND US,
http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez/44?chart=catchchart&dimension=taxon&measure=tonn
age&limit=10 (last visited Dec. 11, 2017).
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vessels are fishing in Bahamian waters.87 Exacerbating this problem,
commercial vessels less than 20 feet in length are not required to
obtain a commercial fishing permit.88 Furthermore, catch statistics
reported to the FAO do not include recreational landings.89 One
study estimated that total landings in the Bahamas were over two and
a half times greater than the reported amount, primarily due to
tourist and sport fishing catches.90 This unreliable data creates
problems for policymakers attempting to issue licenses, set
regulations, and determine the maximum sustainable yield of the
fishery.
The reliability and strength of a host country’s government is
another factor that leads to IUU fishing. In many cases, IUU fishing
is exacerbated by corrupt government officials who allow the DWF to
operate beyond the terms of agreements or in previously prohibited
ways.91 For example, in Vanuatu, a small, pacific-island nation, the
director of the Maritime Authority was also the shipping agent for
foreign long-line vessels.92 Reportedly, “on the same day that he
donated two trucks to the Department of Fisheries, fishing licenses
were granted to two . . . [foreign] long-liners that allowed them to
operate within the six-mile zone off the coast, which was formerly
prohibited under Vanuatu law.”93 Other times, governments fail to
enforce fishing regulations for Chinese vessels because they do not
want to jeopardize other government aid projects China sponsors.94
For example, in Guinea Bissau, the government exempted Chinese

87. See e.g., CARIBBEAN REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, supra note 3, at 20 n.26
(noting that the 2012 data on the number of commercial fishing vessels came from the last
Bahamas fishery census in 1995).
88. Fisheries Resources (Jurisdiction and Conservation) (Act. No. 1/2006) (Bah.) ¶ 11(2).
89. Smith & Zeller, supra note 27, at 1.
90. Id.
91. Alder & Sumaila, supra note 68, at 170.
92. Marie-Noelle Ferrieux-Patterson, Conflict of Interest - Vanuatu’s Experience, in
CONTROLLING CORRUPTION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH REGIONAL
ANTI-CORRUPTION CONFERENCE 71, 73 (2003), https://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanticorruptioninitiative/regionalseminars/35137722.pdf.
93. Id. at 73.
94. China’s DWF Industry, supra note 40, at 103; but see Ecuador Jails Chinese Fisherman
Found with 6,000 Sharks, REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2017) (stating that an Ecuadorian judge sentenced
Chinese fishermen to up to 4 years in prison for illegally fishing in a marine sanctuary); Rachael
Bale, Thousands of Sharks Found on Boat in Huge Illegal Haul, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 15,
2017),
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/08/wildlife-watch-galapagos-illegal-sharkfishing/ (noting that the Ecuadorian government has been criticized for leniently enforcing
fishing regulations with China because China provides a large amount of the government’s
funding).
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boats from laws that prohibit commercial fishing boats from offloading fish catches in foreign ports or onto other ships at sea.95 Such
preferential treatment hurts the domestic and artisanal fishing
industries of host countries and nurtures illegal and unreported
fishing.
It might be argued that the Bahamas need not be as concerned
about corruption affecting a bilateral fishing agreement since the
Bahamas has considerably higher governance indicators than many of
the West African countries currently dealing with Chinese IUU
fishing.96 However, the country’s fishing laws make it particularly
susceptible to corruption. For example, the Bahamas has primarily
regulated its fishery through the Fisheries Resources (Jurisdiction and
Conservation) Act, which banned long-line fishing and prohibited
non-Bahamians from participating in commercial fishing within the
country’s EEZ.97 Foreign vessels may, however, fish commercially as
part of an official treaty if authorized by the Prime Minister.98
Furthermore, parties foreign commercial vessels may also fish if they
receive permission from the governor-general after “it is shown to the
satisfaction of the Governor-General that the pursuit of long-line
fishing . . . would not endanger elements essential to sustainable
fishery development and would not prejudice the development and
expansion of eco-tourism in The Bahamas.”99 This standard appears
to give the governor-general absolute discretion in permitting
commercial vessels. Therefore, if the Bahamian governor general
decided to give long-line fishing permits to select Chinese-Bahamian
joint ventures, the Fisheries Resources Act appears to allow it.
Conflicts arising from IUU fishing are hardly limited to DWF
vessels legally fishing under a bilateral agreement. Notably, three
Chinese fishermen were killed after the South Korean Coast Guard,
which suspected the vessel of illegal fishing, threw flash bang
95. ANDRE STANDING, CHR. MICHELSEN INST., CORRUPTION AND INDUSTRIAL FISHING
AFRICA 12 (2008), https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3188-corruption-and-industrialfishing-in-africa.pdf.
96. See Daniel Kaufman et al., The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and
Analytical Issues (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430, 2010); Kaufman et al.,
Worldwide Governance Indicators, THE WORLD BANK, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/#home (last visited Dec. 11, 2017) (comparing The Bahamas to Cameroon, Ghana, and
Guinea-Bissau across six governance indicators).
97. Fisheries Resources (Jurisdiction and Conservation) (Act. No. 1/2006) (Bah.) ¶7
(prohibiting foreign fishing but creating an exception for sport fishing); Id. at ¶ 2 (defining
“exclusive fishery zone”); Id at ¶ 22 (prohibiting long-line fishing).
98. Id. at ¶ 7–10.
99. Id. at ¶ 22(1).
IN

10. Elliott Final - DELPF Spring 2018 (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2018]

5/29/2018 2:20 PM

CHINESE-BAHAMIAN BILATERAL FISHING AGREEMENT

319

grenades into the boat’s cabin.100 Furthermore, the Argentinian Coast
Guard sunk a Chinese trawler in its EEZ the after the vessel
reportedly ignored warning shots and attempted to ram the Coast
Guard ship.101 The Chinese vessel, which should have been in the high
seas, did not have authority to fish in Argentina’s EEZ.102 In 2017, the
Ecuadorian Navy discovered the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 in the
Galapagos National Park with almost 300 tons of fish on board.103
Recently, the Bahamas has encountered similar problems with illegal
fishing by unauthorized vessels; this will only intensify with Chinese
DWF vessels in the Caribbean.104
Scholars also consider several other factors to determine whether
a country is vulnerable to IUU fishing.105 These factors, which include
the number of internationally attractive species in a country’s
territorial waters, patrol boats per 100,000 square kilometers,
detectible fishing vessels, “monitoring, control, and surveillance”
(MCS) efforts, and proximity to “ports of convenience,” can predict a
country’s vulnerability to IUU fishing.106 The Bahamas ranks poorly
in many of these factors.107
Proximity to ports of convenience, ports used by IUU vessels to
transport illegal catches to international markets, are especially
important facilitators of illegal fishing.108 A country is considered to
have access to a port of convenience if it is located within 1500
nautical miles of the port.109 The Bahamas has access to at least one

100. Choe Sang-Hun, South Korea Investigates Deaths of 3 Chinese Fishermen in
Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2016.
101. Argentina Sinks Chinese Fishing Boat Lu Yan Yuan Yu 010, BRITISH BROADCASTING
COMPANY (MARCH 16, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35815444.
102. Id.
103. Rachael Bale, Thousands of Sharks Found on Boat in Huge Illegal Haul, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 15, 2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/08/wildlife-watchgalapagos-illegal-shark-fishing/.
104. Timothy Roberts, Long Line Fishing Speculated to be Increasing in Bahamian Waters,
THE ABACONIAN (Bah.), Feb. 4, 2014, http://www.theabaconian.com/2014/02/04/long-linefishing-speculated-to-be-increasing-in-bahamian-waters/.
105. See generally Gohar A. Petrossian, Preventing Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated
(IUU) Fishing: A Situational Approach, 189 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 39, 46 (2015)
(determining which factors most effect IUU fishing).
106. See id. at 41 (analyzing the strength of each of these variables in explaining IUU
fishing).
107. See infra notes 108–112 (presenting statistics that show the Bahamas measures poorly
in proximity to ports of convenience and patrol boats per 1,000 kilometers).
108. Id at 46; but see id. at 45 fig.3 (noting that the impact of ports of convenience are less
extreme in the Caribbean than in other geographic areas).
109. Id. at 41.
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port of convenience, Port Cartagena, Colombia, which allows IUU
fishing vessels to easily sell their illegal catch.110 This makes the
Bahamas a prime target for illegal fishing by both legally registered
commercial vessels and unauthorized DWF vessels. The two strongest
variables for predicting IUU fishing in the Caribbean are the number
of patrol boats per 100,000 square kilometers of EEZ and MCS
efforts.111 In this regard, the Bahamas ranks lower than both Ghana
and Cameroon, both countries that have struggled to control IUU
fishing.112 Given the Bahamas’ struggles with monitoring IUU fishing
before expansion of its commercial fishery, it is hard to imagine that
the new commercial fishing vessels would abide by prudent catch
limits or regulations on techniques.113
The presence of China’s DWF in the Bahamas could also
increase IUU fishing in other Caribbean countries. First, many
Caribbean countries are closer ports of convenience than the
Bahamas.114 Also, the Caribbean consists of undeveloped countries
that are particularly susceptible to IUU fishing due to an inability to
invest in fisheries management and patrol surveillance resources.115
From this perspective, these countries are similar to many of the West
African countries struggling with IUU fishing.116

110. See id. (classifying Port Cartagena as a port of convenience). The distance from the
Port of Nassau to Port Cartagena is 1183 nautical miles. Sea Route & Distance, PORTS.COM (last
visited, Dec. 11, 2017).
111. Petrossian, supra note 105, at 43 fig.1 (presenting the strength of the predictor
variables in each region). Overall, the study found that monitoring activities and the number of
internationally attractive species were the two best predictors of IUU fishing. Id. at 42.
However, neither the number of internationally attractive species nor ports of convenience had
a large impact on IUU fishing in Central and South America. Id. at 44–45 fig.2,3.
112. See generally ERIC WERTHEIM, THE NAVAL INSTITUTE GUIDE TO COMBAT FLEETS
OF THE WORLD (16th ed. 2013) (for the number of patrol boats of each country); Tools & Data,
THE SEA AROUND US, http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez (last visited Dec. 15, 2017)(for
the size of the EEZ of each country).
113. Nico Scavella, University Professors Warn of Dangers of $2.1bn Andros Plan, TRIBUNE
(Nassau, Bah.) (Nov. 14, 2016).
114. See e.g., Sea Route & Distance, PORTS.COM (last visited, Dec. 11, 2017). Port-au-Prince,
Haiti is located 704 nautical miles from Port Cartagna. Id. Port Royal, Jamaica is located 373
nautical miles from Port Cartagna. Id.
115. See e.g., SELIM JAHAN, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2016 200 tbl.1 (2016) (classifying Haiti as a country with low human development); See
Petrossian, supra note 105, at 45.
116. See JAHAN, supra note 115 tbl.1 (classifying Cameroon and Guinea-Bissau as a
countries with low human development).
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Targeting Migratory Fish: Impact on Artisanal Fishermen
& Other Countries

A commercial fishing industry that targets migratory species is
problematic.117 Large pelagic fish are not located in the Bahamas
throughout the entire year.118 Once these fish migrate from the
Bahamas, China’s DWF will be faced with three choices: 1) follow the
fish, 2) shift production to another permanent species, or 3) cease
production and wait until the fish return. The third option seems
improbable given the amount of investment China would put into the
agreement, and the other two options are similarly challenging.
The geography of the Caribbean fishery makes following the
migratory fish unlikely. Scientists estimate that mahi-mahi migrate at
least 8,000 miles throughout the Caribbean Sea, United States waters,
and high seas.119 Although the DWF could normally follow the fish
into the high seas, countries in the Caribbean fishery are so
concentrated that the entire fishery consists of country’s EEZs.120
Absent an agreement with the other Caribbean country, following the
fish would constitute IUU fishing.
Shifting production to a permanent species during slow months is
also problematic for the Bahamian domestic fishing industry. Many of
the deep-water pelagic fish migrate by September, at which time more
permanent species like snapper and grouper are still plentiful.121
While the large pelagic fishery might be underexploited in the
Bahamas, it is doubtful that stocks of other, more permanent species
could handle an influx of 100 commercial fishing vessels.122
Furthermore, these species are critical to the artisanal fishermen.123
117. See IVAN GOODBODY & ELIZABETH M. THOMAS-HOPE, NATURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN 170–71 (2002) (posing
the question, “[W]hat do you do when species migrates?”).
118. Bahamas
Fishing
Calendar,
BAHAMAS
FISHING
CHARTERS,
http://www.fishinthebahamas.com/bahamas-fishing-calendar/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2017).
119. DOLPHINFISH RES. PROGRAM, General Movement Patterns, COOPERATIVE SCIENCE
SERVICES http://dolphintagging.homestead.com/GenMovePatterns.html (last visited Dec. 13,
2017).
120. Singh, supra note 16, at 3.
121. See Bahamas Fishing Calendar, supra note 118 (showing that in September, fishing for
Bluefin Tuna, Mahi-Mahi, Kingfish, White Marlin, Blue Marlin, and Wahoo is either “Fair” or
“Poor”).
122. See, e.g., 81 C.F.R. § 42268 (2016) (stating that the Nassau Grouper is over-exploited in
the Bahamas).
123. See Nicole M. Cushioin & Kathleen Sullivan-Sealey, Landings, Effort and Socioeconomics of a Small Scale Commercial Fishery in The Bahamas, 60 GULF AND CARIBBEAN
FISHERIES INST. (2007) 162, 164 (showing results of the five most abundant species landed by
artisanal fishermen at New Provence).
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Even if the Bahamas establishes fishing zones exclusively for artisanal
fishermen, Chinese vessels have ignored these boundaries in other
countries, leading to violent conflict.124 For example, in Liberia,
Chinese DWF vessels regularly collide with artisanal fishing canoes
and have sprayed artisanal fishermen with hot water when conflicts
escalate.125 One Liberian fisherman even claimed he was detained on
a Chinese vessel and severely beaten.126 Although this type of conflict
is probably less likely in a more developed country like the Bahamas,
similar conflicts might occur if a bilateral agreement is reached.
iii.

Delimitation of the Bahamas-US Exclusive Economic
Zone

In addition the Bahamas’ close proximity to other Caribbean
countries, it is also located within 200 miles of the United States.
Therefore, the countries have overlapping EEZs.127 Article 74 of
UNCLOS states, “[t]he delimitation of the exclusive economic zone
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by
agreement on the basis of international law . . . [and States] shall
make every effort . . . not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the
final agreement.”128 The Bahamas and the United States have not yet
delimited their EEZs and currently disagree on the northern axis of
the Bahamas’s potential maritime boundary.129 With the EEZ of the
Bahamas not yet determined, a bilateral fishing agreement risks the
unauthorized entry by Chinese-owned vessels into waters claimed by
the United States. Such an entry could further strain diplomatic
relations over ocean rights between the two countries.130

124. See e.g., BLOMEYER ET AL., supra note 21 at 73 (quoting MIKAEL CULLBERG, TO
DRAW THE LINE: EU FISHERIES AGREEMENTS IN WEST AFRICA 16 (Swedish Society for
Nature Conservation, 2009)) (noting that Chinese trawlers destroy habitat and fishing traps in
artisanal zones in Mauritania).
125. China’s DWF Industry, supra note 40, at 104.
126. Id.
127. The World Factbook: The Bahamas, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/bf.html (last updated Nov. 29, 2017) (noting that the United States and the
Bahamas have not yet delimited their maritime boundaries).
128. Fisheries Resources (Jurisdiction and Conservation) (Act. No. 1/2006) (Bah.) ¶ 74(a).
129. The World Factbook: The Bahamas, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/bf.html (last updated Nov. 29, 2017).
130. Trump offers to Mediate in Protracted South China Sea Feud, BOS. HERALD, Nov. 12,
2017,
http://www.bostonherald.com/news/international/2017/11/trump_offers_to_mediate_in_
protracted_south_china_sea_feud.
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Impact on the Tourism and Sport Fishing Industry

As previously noted, the tourism and sport fishing industry has a
greater effect on the Bahamian economy than commercial fishing.131
However, inadequate catch data for the recreational fishing industry
makes setting commercial quotas difficult because experts cannot
determine the fishery’s maximum sustainable yield. Until the
Bahamas is able to gather more information about the deep-water
pelagic fishery, it risks overfishing these species by expanding its
commercial fishing industry.
III. LEGAL RESPONSES TO A CHINESE-BAHAMIAN
COMMERCIAL FISHING AGREEMENT
The Caribbean Fishery has a number of governance tools
available to countries and other stakeholders should it wish to object
to a Chinese-Bahamian commercial fishing agreement. Some of these
tools provide only short-term solutions, while others are long-term
strategies intended to change the world’s perception of fishery
management.
A. UN Fish Stock Agreement: A Short-term Solution
UNCLOS Article 63 states, “[w]here the same stock[s] . . . occur
within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States,
these States shall seek . . . to agree upon the measures necessary to
coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such
stocks.”132 Article 64 requires coastal states and other states whose
nationals fish the region, including the high seas, for highly migratory
species (including tuna, mahi-mahi, swordfish, and marlin) to
cooperate with a view to ensuring conservation and promote
optimum utilization of the species throughout the region.133 Although
the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement, signed by both the Bahamas and the United States,
purports to implement these principles.134 However, in many ways,
the Fish Stocks Agreement provides more protection for fisheries
than UNCLOS. First, it “goes further than [UNCLOS] in placing
emphasis on long-term conservation and sustainable use, rather than

131.
132.
133.
134.

See supra text accompanying notes 25–27.
UNCLOS, supra note 14, at art. 63.
See id. at annex I; UNCLOS, supra note 14, at art. 64.
CHAKALALL & COCHRANE, supra note 6, at 9.
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optimum utilization.”135 Also, the agreement refers to “highly
migratory fish stocks” rather than the mere “highly migratory
species” list in UNCLOS, which broadens the range of resources to
which the agreement applies.136 For these reasons, the Fish Stocks
Agreement is a powerful weapon for opponents to a bilateral fishing
agreement in the Caribbean.
The United States or another Caribbean country could use
climate change and the Fish Stocks Agreement to prevent a ChineseBahamian bilateral agreement. Article 7 of the Fish Stocks
Agreement states,
If a natural phenomenon has a significant adverse
impact on the status of straddling fish stocks or
highly migratory fish stocks, States shall adopt
conservation and management measures on an
emergency basis to ensure that fishing activity does
not exacerbate such adverse impact. States shall also
adopt such measures on an emergency basis where
fishing activity presents a serious threat to the
sustainability of such stocks.137
This provision implements UNCLOS’s “precautionary principle”
by seeking to reduce the probability of adverse events when the level
of uncertainty and potential costs of the event are significant and full
reversibility is not ensured.138 Unlike the rigid precautionary
principle, however, the Fish Stocks Agreement adopts the
“precautionary approach,” which allows for less stringent measures
and does not bring all marine fishing activities to a halt.139
The precautionary approach in Article 6 of the Fish Stocks
Agreement might be appropriate to slow down a Chinese-Bahamian
bilateral fishing agreement.140 According to a recent study, the
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 34 I.L.M. 1542, 1552 (1995)
[hereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement].
138. See S.M. Garcia, The Precautionary Principle: Its Implications in Capture Fisheries
Management, 22 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 99, 101 (1994) (discussing proper application of
the precautionary principle).
139. See SIMON MARR, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA:
MODERN DECISION MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2003) (distinguishing between the
“precautionary principle” and the “precautionary approach”).
140. Although more research on the actual effects of dead zones on the Bahamas’ fishery
would probably be needed to prevail on a claim under Article 7, low oxygen levels and habitat
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ocean’s oxygen content has decreased by more than two percent over
the last 50 years, potentially due to climate change.141 This
phenomenon has led to deep-water “dead zones” of reduced oxygen,
causing habitat loss for “high performance” fish such as marlin,
swordfish, and other migratory species that need high levels of
oxygen to survive.142 As a result, these species have become more
concentrated in high-oxygen areas, leading to potentially overoptimistic population estimates and placing these species at higher
risk from near-surface fishing methods.143 The dead zones have also
been known to cause reproductive problems in some fish.144
Significantly, the ocean near Andros Island, the site of the
proposed joint ventures, experienced a substantial decrease in oxygen
level during the past decade.145 Given the already uncertain capacity
of the Bahamas deep-water pelagic fishery, expanding the commercial
fishing sector would conflict with any emergency conservation
measure under Article 6. It should be noted, however, that
conservation measures taken under this provision are only temporary,
so a claim under Article 6 is not a long-term solution.146
In addition to a preventative measure, the Fish Stocks
Agreement could be used to limit the scope of a joint venture.
Paragraph 6 of Article 6 of the Fish Stocks Agreement states,
For new or exploratory fisheries, States shall adopt
as soon as possible cautious conservation and
management measures, including, inter alia, catch
limits and effort limits. Such measures shall remain
loss might justify emergency conservation measures under the Fish Stocks Agreement if the
impact is significant. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 137.
141. See Sunke Schmidtko et al., Decline in Global Oceanic Oxygen Content During the Past
Five Decades, 542 NATURE 335 (2017) (discussing the decreasing oxygen content of the world’s
oceans).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. What
Causes
Ocean
“Dead
Zones”?,
SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN,
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ocean-dead-zones/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2017).
145. See Global Ocean De-Oxygenation Quantified, GEOMAR, https://www.geomar.de/en/
news/article/weniger-sauerstoff-in-allen-meeren/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2017) (presenting a
graphic that displays the percent change of dissolved oxygen in the global ocean over the last
decade).
146. Note that the precautionary principle under the Fish Stocks Agreement only justifies a
temporary stay of a bilateral fishing agreement that expands the Bahamian commercial fishing
industry. It does not justify the more aggressive approach of allowing a country to utilize its
EEZ solely for sport fishing. See Garcia, supra note 138, at 122 (noting that the principle, “if
incorrectly applied, is an attempt to re-allocate resources to non-consumptive users, often
without much reference or concern towards intra-generational equity or scientific objectivity.”).
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in force until there are sufficient data to allow
assessment of the impact of the fisheries on the longterm sustainability of the stocks, whereupon
conservation and management measures based on
that assessment shall be implemented. The latter
measures shall, if appropriate, allow for the gradual
development of the fisheries.147
Here, the interpretation of “new or exploratory fisheries,” is
critical. Although the agreement does not define “new,”
“exploratory,” or “fishery,” this provision might apply to impose
stringent catch limits on a newly formed deep-water pelagic
commercial fishing industry.148 For instance, the Commission for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources defines a “new”
fishery as a “species and (or) fishing on a ground that has not been
previously fished,” which encompasses proposals to expand a fishing
area.149 Although this definition is not directly relevant to the Fish
Stocks Agreement, opponents could similarly argue that the
Bahamian deep-water pelagic fishery is a “new” or “exploratory”
fishery because it has not been commercially fished.150 In such a case,
the aforementioned data collection problems should trigger
conservation measures under this provision and limit the impact of
China’s DWF.
A. Escaping the Concept of Optimum Utilization: A Global Shift
The Fish Stock Agreement moves away from the concept of
Maximum Sustainable Yield and towards concepts like “long term
conservation” and “sustainable use.”151 However, the Fish Stock

147. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 137, at ¶ 6 (emphasis added).
148. See MARR, supra note 139, at 17 (noting that the precautionary approach restricts pilot
activities that might pose an irreversible environmental threat); see also, Fish Stocks Agreement,
supra note 134 at ¶ 2 (“States shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable
or inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not be used as a reason for
postponing or failing to take conservation and management measures.”).
149. EVELYNE MELTZER & SUSANNA FULLER, THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES: REGIONAL EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE 1995 UNITED NATIONS
FISH STOCKS AGREEMENT 123 (2009).
150. See Track a Fishery, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://fisheries.msc.org/en/
fisheries/@@search (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) (noting that the only recognized fishery in the
Bahamas is the Bahamian Spiny Lobster Fishery); What is a Fishery, MARINE STEWARDSHIP
COUNCIL, https://www.msc.org/track-a-fishery/what-is-a-fishery (last visited Dec. 28, 2017)
(recognizing that the FAO defines a fishery by, among other factors, the type of fishers and the
purpose of the activities).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 137–39.
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Agreement does not apply to all species– it only prevents certain
actions both inside a country’s EEZ and in the high seas that affect
migratory species.152 Therefore, UNCLOS’s Maximum Sustainable
Yield concept still prevails over domestic fisheries that target nonmigratory species. As long as this concept controls, countries will
continue to view fisheries as exploitable resources and underestimate
their conservation value.153
Admittedly, some countries have tried to integrate amorphous
principles of long-term conservation and sustainability into the rigid
Maximum Sustainable Yield formula. For example, in the Bahamas
and the United States, “optimum yield” is defined as the amount of
resources “which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the
nation with particular reference to food production and recreational
opportunities, and which is prescribed as such on the basis of the
maximum sustainable yield from a fishery as modified by any
economic, social, or ecological factors.”154 Furthermore, the
precautionary approach, which has arguably become accepted
international law,155 promotes the conservation value of a fishery
above its economic value (but only when uncertainty exists).156
However, these concepts do not clearly and explicitly give a country
free reign to establish a sport-fishing conservation area.157 Until
countries like the Bahamas are freed from the obligation of optimum
utilization, this type of “exploitation” cannot be achieved. Instead,
these countries will always feel pressure to exploit their fisheries by

152. See Management of Large Pelagic Fisheries in CARICOM Countries, FAO, 2004, at 8
(“The agreement sets out general principles for the conservation and management of straddling
and highly migratory fish stocks . . . that parties to the agreement are to apply on the high seas
as well as within their EEZs.”).
153. See Hern, supra note 6, at 195 (noting that UNCLOS “retains the monolithic vision of a
global commercial fishery that may not be of service to future generations of resource
managers”).
154. WILLIAM R. EDESON & JEAN-FRANCOIS PULVENIS, THE LEGAL REGIME OF
FISHERIES IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION 48 (1983).
155. See Simon Marr, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases: The Precautionary Approach and
Conservation and Management of Fish Resources, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 823 (2000) (discussing
the conflict among international legal authors concerning the status of the precautionary
approach as a binding norm of customary international law).
156. See Hern, supra note 6, at 194 (describing the precautionary principle as a temporary
buffer between the MSY and the requirement of optimum utilization when scientific uncertainty
exists).
157. Hern, supra note 6; see John M. MacDonald, Appreciating the Precautionary Principle
as an Ethical Evolution in Ocean Management, 26 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 255, 257 (1995)
(arguing that application of the precautionary principle to fisheries management decisions must
be changed to reflect the value choices inherent in these decisions).
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expanding their own commercial fishing sectors or executing bilateral
agreements with distant water fishing nations.
A legal regime that gives countries more freedom to promote
conservation within its EEZ would be more beneficial to Caribbean
countries than mere restraints and exceptions to optimum utilization.
For example, countries like the Bahamas would receive much higher
exchange value on their living resources by using their EEZ solely for
sports and recreational fishing and marketing its under-exploited
fishery “as a scarce resource in an overfished world.”158 Alternatively,
the Bahamas could operate its EEZ primarily as an eco-tourism area
but make exceptions for small-scale fishermen by keeping artisanal
fishing areas or expanding aquaculture industry.159 This approach
would allow Bahamians to continue to feed their communities and
preserve their culture. Since Caribbean countries have the
infrastructure to support major tourism economies and hold a
competitive advantage by being relatively unspoiled by major
commercial fishing industries, they would be prime candidates for
such a conservation and recreational fishing area.160 In fact, the
Bahamas has already experimented with this idea, prohibiting all
commercial shark fishing in its EEZ.161 Although shark fins are a
desirable product on the international market, the Bahamian
government instead sought to protect the $110 million recreational
shark diving industry.162 The United States and other neighboring
coastal countries would be wise to support this type of system since it
prevents the problems that accompany bilateral agreements between
Caribbean countries and other distant water fishing nations.
Implementing such a legal regime has a number of challenges.
First, it would constitute a major shift in global fisheries management.

158. Id. at 195. Under such a scheme, the Bahamas would still need to implement catch
limits for sport fishers to prevent them from “essentially engaging in commercial fishing ‘under
the guise of sport fishing.’” Smith & Zeller, supra note 27, at 16.
159. Hern, supra note 6, at 195. The Bahamas has experimented with aquaculture
production for some pelagic fish, but this industry is not currently developed. See CARIBBEAN
REGIONAL FISHERIES MECHANISM, supra note 3, at 9–10, tbl.4 (noting experimental rearing of
cobia in sea cages).
160. See generally discussion, supra Section II.A (describing the Bahamas’ fishery and
economy).
161. Bahamas Acts to Protect Sharks, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (July 5, 2011),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/press-releases/2011/07/05/bahamas-acts-toprotect-sharks.
162. Andrea R. Haas et al., The Contemporary Economic Value of Elasmobranchs in the
Bahamas: Reaping the Rewards of 25 Years of Stewardship and Conservation, 207 BIOLOGICAL
CONSERVATION 55, 59 (2017).
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Furthermore, the United States’ ability to lead this movement is
uncertain. Although UNCLOS is widely regarded as customary
international law, the United States is one of the few countries to
never ratify the agreement.163 Its status under UNCLOS gives it
credibility to lead the charge against one of the treaty’s fundamental
tenets. However, its unwillingness to ratify the almost unanimous
agreement has hurt its global reputation as a leader in ocean policy
reform. If the United States wants to promote a change from
UNCLOS’s concept of optimum utilization, it must determine which
position gives it more credibility.
Another hurdle in implementing such a regime is China’s status
as a nonparty under the Fish Stocks Agreement. China has explicitly
refused to ratify the agreement, citing disagreements surrounding
provisions that allow countries other than the flag state164 to use force
during inspection of fishing vessels.165 Therefore, China, one of the
world’s largest DWF nations, is not legally obligated under the most
significant conservation and sustainability provisions in High Seas
fisheries management. This undermines a regime that allows for a
country to use its EEZ primarily as a sports fishing conservation area
because of the highly migratory nature of deep-water pelagic fish. If
Chinese DWFs ignore sustainable fishing practices, coastal countries
will have no incentive to create a sport fishing conservation area
because Chinese vessels fishing on the High Seas will deplete their
fish stocks. Therefore, the countries seeking to implement such a
regime would have to give up something to gain China’s compliance
with the Fish Stock Agreement.
Given China’s refusal to recognize the recent arbitral tribunal
ruling in the South China Sea–166 a tribunal established based on the
rules prescribed in Annex VII of UNCLOS–167 countries could be
skeptical that China would comply with the Fish Stock Agreement,
even if it were ratified. Therefore, countries would only value China’s
ratification if they could be assured that China would enforce the
agreement with its DWF. Countries seeking increased sustainability

163. Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N.,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (last visited Dec. 28, 2017).
164. A flag state is “the State in whose territory the Ship is registered.” UNCLOS art. 91(1).
165. Mallory Testimony, supra note 8, at 5.
166. Tom Phillips, Oliver Holmes & Owen Bowcott, Beijing rejects tribunal’s ruling in South
China Sea case, THE GUARDIAN, July 12, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china.
167. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 14, at Annex VII.
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have a few bargaining chips they could give up to gain China’s
support. With the growing global disapproval of capacity subsidies,
evidenced by the environmental provisions of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership,168 partial allowance of subsidies might convince China to
support a governance regime that allows large-scale sport and
conservation fisheries. However, this approach has some problems.
Given China’s reliance on these subsidies, the country is unlikely to
agree to any restriction, even if some subsidies are allowed.
Furthermore, if the United States views fishing subsidies as the
ultimate problem behind overfishing, softening its stance on this issue
may be a poor tradeoff.169
Proponents of a conservation regime could also reconsider their
position on the Fish Stock Agreement’s inspection provisions, which
are China’s biggest concern with the agreement. However, given flag
states’ inability to adequately monitor Chinese DWF vessels,
countries like the United States might want as much inspection ability
as possible.
Although both of these solutions are problematic, proponents of
a conservation regime must find a way to get China’s support in order
to have a chance at successfully integrating international law concepts
that allow a country to use its EEZ primarily for sport and
recreational fishing.
A. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RESPONSES TO A CHINESEBAHAMIAN COMMERCIAL FISHING AGREEMENT
The United States could also use political influence or economic
incentives to prevent a Chinese-Bahamian commercial fishing
agreement. As the Bahamas’ leading trade partner, the United States
could pressure the country into abandoning the deal. The United
States government has already leveraged this tactic to some extent,
stating that such an agreement would endanger “security,
cooperation, tourism, economic interrelations, economic

168. Trans-Pacific Partnership Art. 20.16 (draft Feb. 4, 2016) (TPP Final Draft).
(“[T]he Parties acknowledge that . . . fisheries subsidies that contribute to overfishing and
overcapacity, and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing can have significant
negative impacts on trade, development and the environment . . . .”).
169. See generally Anastasia Telesetsky, Following the Leader: Eliminating Perverse Global
Fishing Subsidies Through Unilateral Domestic Trade Measures, 65 ME. L. REV. 627 (2013)
(proposing the total elimination of fishing subsidies).

10. Elliott Final - DELPF Spring 2018 (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2018]

5/29/2018 2:20 PM

CHINESE-BAHAMIAN BILATERAL FISHING AGREEMENT

331

contributions . . . [and] would most certainly have a negative impact
on our relations with [the Bahamas].”170
The United States could also attempt to prevent a bilateral
agreement by encouraging American investment in Bahamian
tourism, hotels, agriculture, and infrastructure. Since Chinese
investment in these areas was a principal motivation behind the
discussions, the United States can eliminate the Bahamas’ incentive
to do a deal by filling this void itself.171 The United States must
dramatically increase its efforts to compete with China in this domain.
Currently, China is the only country that has signed any type of
bilateral investment treaty with the Bahamas.172 Notably, Chinese
companies were major financers of a $4.2 billion luxury resort in
Nassau173 and a $2.6 billion port facility in Freeport.174 This activity is
not limited to the Bahamas, as Chinese investment in the Caribbean
has increased tenfold since 2005.175 Although the United States has
already established good relations with the Bahamas by way of trade,
it should consider encouraging investment into a country that is
desperate to grow its infrastructure.
Similarly, if a Chinese-Bahamian joint venture becomes
inevitable, the United States should consider entering into its own
bilateral fishing agreement with the Bahamas. Although some of the
same problems with the proposed agreement may persist in a bilateral
agreement with the United States,176 bilateral fishing agreements are
not inherently risky. With proper monitoring and control, the
Bahamian commercial fishing industry can be expanded sustainably.
However, sustainable growth is doubtful if the Bahamas tries to
170. Nominations (Immediately Following “Assessing the Colombia Peace Process: The Way
Forward in U.S.-Columbia Relations” Subcommittee Hearing) Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 115th Cong. (2017), available at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/nominations080217.
171. See Gray Suggests Chinese Agri-Fisheries Deal Still Open to Negotiation, supra note 64
(noting that the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries of the Bahamas expressed concern over
losing Chinese investment in other sectors after failed discussions for a bilateral fishing
agreement).
172. Bilateral Treaty Register, http://mofa.gov.bs/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/BILATERALTREATY-REGISTER2011.pdf (last updated Apr. 8, 2011).
173. Shivani Vora, In the Bahamas, a Long-Awaited Opening for Baha Mar Resort, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/17/travel/bahamas-baha-mar-resortnassau-hotel-casino-opening.html.
174. RICHARD L. BERNAL, INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK, CHINESE FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN: POTENTIAL AND PROSPECTS 8 (2016).
175. Id.
176. Under such an agreement, a question remains whether the Bahamas’ deep-water
pelagic fishery could sustain both a recreational and commercial fishing industry.
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expand by partnering with China’s DWF, which often ignores
sustainable fishing practices and is not monitored by its flag state.
Instead, the United States is better geographically situated to ensure
proper control and monitoring over the commercial fleet. However,
the United States cannot use resource conservation as a veil to
enhance its own competitiveness in the Caribbean fishery.177 Instead,
such an agreement must be designed to encourage the Bahamas to
grow its commercial fishing industry sustainably and responsibly.
B. CONCLUSION
Put into context with China’s other DWF enterprises, a bilateral
fishing agreement with the Bahamas could have devastating
environmental effects. IUU fishing, international maritime disputes,
and conflicts with artisanal fishermen are all likely consequences of
such an agreement. If the Bahamas reopen discussions over such an
agreement, the United States may be able to use political pressure or
the Fish Stocks Agreement as a short-term solution. However, a
global shift in fisheries management is needed to promote the longterm sustainability of the Caribbean Fishery. The recent ChineseBahamian discussions should motivate United States to lead such a
shift.

177. See China’s DWF Industry, supra note 40, at 106 (“[S]ome developed DWF countries,
in order to enhance their own competitiveness in areas, will certainly use the excuse of resource
conservation to keep other new countries out, such as by signing agreements with these host
countries that limit the number of countries and fishing boats in certain areas.”); MacDonald,
supra note 157, at 257 (noting that critics of the precautionary principle view it as a way to
promote cultural imperialism).

